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punitive damages, are not available under general maritime law. The court then dismissed the 
balance of defendant-appellant's arguments as being without merit. 
' 
Christopher R. Bryant. Class of 2000 
JONES ACT NEGLIGENCE, UNSEAWORTHINESS AND PRIMARY DUTY RULE 
Injured seaman claiming Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness defeated summary 
judgment motions by presenting evidence showing that his fall into an open hatch may 
have been caused b�' unreasonably cramped and slippery working conditions. Primary 
Duty rule does not bar seaman's claims when the dangerous condition was not created 
by the seaman nor it could be controlled or eliminated by him. 
Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd. Partnership 1 1 1  F.3rd 658 (9th Cir. 1 997) 
(Decided April 1 4, 1 997) 
Seaman Anton Ribitzki ("Ribitzki") was sent by his employer, Piquniq Service Company 
("Piquniq"), to work aboard the oil drilling ship CANMAR SSDC ("Canmar"). His job was to 
clean the ship's shale pit by hosing away mud and shale after the Canmar finished hole drilling 
operations. Ribitzki injured himself while walking toward an open hatch as he uncoiled the hose 
he used for his cleaning duties. A kink developed in the hose which caused plaintiff to avert his 
focus away from the open hatch. He then either slipped or stepped into the open hatch. There 
were no witnesses to the accident. Ribitzki suffered serious knee injuries as a result of the mishap 
for which he filed a Jones Act negligence claim against his employer, Piquniq, and an 
unseaworthiness claim against the vessel and her owners. 
The central thrust of plaintiffs claim is that the pitroom where he fell was unreasonably 
cramped and slippery for the tasks he was assigned to perform. The pit room measured four-feet 
by sixteen-feet in length: the hatch measured two-feet by two-feet, thus leaving two feet of deck 
space between the open hatch and pit room bulkhead. In depositions, Ribitzki testified that there 
was mud near the hatch area that may have caused him to slip. However, he was not certain 
whether he slipped or just stepped into the open hatch. Defendants aver that there was no mud 
in the pit room on the day plaintiff fell. They further allege that plaintiff was well aware of the 
conditions in the pit room and did not exercise proper care in that he should have laid the hose 
on the ground and walked to the area where the kink developed. 
Under these facts, the district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff on both 
actions. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 
I. Jones Act Negligence In its de novo review of the facts, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable plaintiff, satisfied all the elements of a Jones Act 
claim, namely, duty, breach, notice and causation. 
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Duty: Piquniq dispatched Ribitzki to work aboard the Canmar and thus had a duty to provide him 
with a safe work environment while aboard. 
Breach: Ribitzki claims Piquniq breached its duty to provide a safe place to work because the pit 
room where he was assigned was unreasonably slippery and cramped. The court held that a 
reasonable jury could find that the two feet of space between the open hatch and the bulkhead 
was insufficient space to safely perform the work Ribitzki was assigned. Further, even if Ribitzki 
contributed to the accident through his negligence, it would not act to cancel the employer's 
negligence, if any. As for whether or not the deck was slippery, the Court of Appeals held that 
it was settled law that such issues are questions of fact for the jury to determine. Davilla v. SIS 
Vercharmian, 247 F.Supp. 617, 619 (E.D Va. 1 965). 
Notice: An employer will not be held liable under the Jones Act unless it knew, or should have 
known, of the dangerous conditions. Constructive notice could be charged, if in the exercise of 
reasonable care, the employer could have discovered the alleged dangerous condition. Here, there 
was no actual notice of the dangerous conditions; however, a jury could find constructive notice 
in that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed to Piquniq that the pit area was unreasonably 
cramped and would be unreasonably slippery during clean-up operations. 
Causation: A seaman, to survive summary judgment on the issue of causation, is only required 
to show that the employer's alleged negligence played a role, however slight, in causing his 
injury. Herein, Ribitzki produced sufficient evidence for a jury to find that his employer's 
negligence, if proved, played some role in causing his injury. 
II. Unseaworthiness - The court found that plaintiff established all four elements necessary to 
overcome summary judgement in his unseaworthiness claim against the Canmar and its owners: 
1 )  Ship owners have an absolute duty to furnish seaman with a safe place to work or live. Actual 
or constructive knowledge of unseaworthiness is not required. Here plaintiff was a seaman aboard 
the Canmar so this element is satisfied. 
2) The injury must be caused by ship's equipment or appurtenant appliances. Plaintiff was injured 
by Canmar equipment, to wit, the open hatch attached to the Canmar. 
3) A seaman, though not entitled to a perfect place to work, is entitled to a reasonably safe place 
to work. Evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff permits an inference that the pit 
room was unreasonably slippery and cramped for its intended use so as to defeat a summary 
judgment motion. 
4) Causation is established by showing that the unseaworthy condition was a substantial factor 
in causing the injury. Here sufficient evidence was provided to permit a reasonable jury to find 
that the cramped and slippery conditions were a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries. 
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III. Primarv Dutv Rule - Under this rule, a seaman may not recover for an injury caused by his 
own failure to perform a duty imposed on him by his employment. Defendant here argues that 
Ribitzki's injury was caused by his failure to properly clean the pit room. Thus, defendant 
contends he should be precluded from recovery. The court, however, recognized an exception to 
this rule in that when a plaintiff is injured by a condition he did not create nor could control, the 
primary duty rule does not apply. Thus, the court held that because Ribitzki did not create the 
cramped or slippery conditions, nor could he have controlled or eliminated them, the primary duty 
rule was not applicable. 
The Court of Appeals thus reversed the district court by finding that Ribitzki presented 
sufficient evidence to defeat defendant's summary judgment motions. The case was remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
Steve Stavridis, Class of 1998 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
The intentions of the parties, prior courses of dealing and trade usage are controlling in 
determining whether a "mixed" contract qualifies for admiralty jurisdiction. 
Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Division of Ace Young Inc . . 
109 F.3d 105, 1997 A.M.C. 1772 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
(Decided March 13, 1997) 
In March 1994, Daewoo Automotive Components, Ltd. ("Daewoo") contracted with 
defendant-appellant Ace Shipping Corp. ("Ace") for the transport of automobile parts from New 
York to Korea. Six bills of lading for the transportation of the parts from New York, via Seattle, 
to Pusan, Korea were executed, and served as contracts of carriage. 
Ace is classified as a non-vessel-owning common carrier ("NVOCC"). As such, Ace 
arranges for shipment of cargo, but does not itself own a ship. Ace arranged for shipment with 
Hyundai Intermodal, Inc. ("Hyundai"), which placed the cargo on a train from New York to 
Seattle. Enroute to Seattle the train derailed which caused severe damage to the cargo and 
significantly lessened its value. The cargo was insured by the plaintiff-appellee Transatlantic 
Marine Claims Agency ("Transatlantic"), which paid Daewoo and brought this action in admiralty 
as a subrogee of Daewoo. Ace, Hyundai, Burlington Northern (the rail carrier), and Conrail were 
named as defendants. 
Ace failed to respond to the complaint and Transatlantic prevailed on a motion for default 
judgment, and was awarded $51,753.86 against Ace. Transatlantic entered into a stipulation with 
the remaining defendants, discontinuing its case against them. Ace then appealed the default 
judgment entered in the district court, claiming the coun lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In the 
complaint Transatlantic invoked only admiralty jurisdiction, probably due to the fact that the 
original claim failed to meet the amount in controversy required by the Federal Rules of Civil 
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